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Abstract 
 
The article presents a critical review of the contemporary methods of measuring presidential power in political science. The 
author analyzes these methods, describing each and demonstrating their advantages and disadvantages. When discussing 
mistakes in the measurement of presidential powers, the author tries to remove some of the problems associated with the 
measurement. He modifies Krouwel’s method based on measuring the presidential score and parliamentary score that allows 
us to “weigh” the presidential and parliamentary components of any form of government, whether presidential, parliamentary, or 
semi-presidential. The author codes ten variables. He suggests a method of measuring based on the calculation of the index of 
the form of government (IFG), which is calculated by subtracting the parliamentary score from the presidential score. A positive 
IFG indicates the attraction of a system to presidentialism, and negative its shift to parliamentarism. The index analysis of forms 
of government opens up opportunities to gain knowledge about the volume of presidential powers in different countries, to 
develop a typology of regimes, to determine the relationship between the form of government and the consolidation of 
democracy, and to track the dynamics of regimes. 
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1. Introduction 
 
A few years ago, it had never occurred to anyone to measure forms of government. However, in recent years, political 
scientists have widely adopted an index analysis of presidential power, and there are now several methods of measuring 
presidential power that allow to imagine numerically not only the power of actors, but also the nature of the form of 
government. 
What is the significance of the measurement of presidential power? 
In answering this, it is first necessary to gain knowledge about the volume of presidential powers in different 
countries, which allows us to compare the “strength” and “weakness” of the presidential and parliamentary authority. In 
particular, we can empirically confirm or refute the common idea of the super-strong power of the president (“super-
presidentialism”) in, for example, countries of the former Soviet Union (Zaznaev, 2014, p. 197) and Eastern and Central 
Europe. In addition, a quantitative method may help researchers to suggest options for political reform in these states. 
Second, as M.S. Shugart and J. Carey (1992) convincingly showed by skilfully combining quantitative and 
qualitative research, measuring presidential power allows us to develop a comprehensive typology of regimes (pp. 158–
160), and to draw clear boundaries between presidentialism, parliamentarism, semi-presidentialism, and other types.  
Third, the index of presidential power opens up opportunities for further implementation of correlation, regression, 
and factor analysis. In particular, it makes is possible to determine the relationship between the form of government and 
the consolidation of democracy, i.e. to verify empirically J. Linz’s (1990) hypothesis on the “perils” of presidentialism and 
assess the arguments of his opponents.  
Fourth, measuring presidential power provides the ability to track the dynamics of regimes. Focusing on qualitative 
categories (presidentialism, parliamentarism, semi-presidentialism etc.) means it is extremely difficult to determine in 
which direction the regime moves. For example, there are difficulties in trying to determine how the form of government in 
Kyrgyzstan has changed following the “Tulip Revolution” in 2006–2007: Kyrgyzstan under Askar Akayev was semi-
presidential, and after he was overthrown it has become semi-presidential once again. However, there is no doubt that 
the relationship between the president, government, and parliament has changed, which can be determined using 
quantitative methods. 
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2. Literature Review: Methods of Measuring Presidential Power 
 
Shugart and Carey (1992) formulated the most authoritative method. To assess presidential powers, they used “a simple 
interval scoring method on each of several aspects in which systems with elected presidencies vary” (p. 148) and divided 
all powers into two groups – legislative and nonlegislative. Each power is assessed on a 4–3–2–1–0 scale, and then all 
scores are summed (pp. 148–166). The authors focused only on the formal presidential prerogatives, such as those 
included in the constitution, and did not consider the political practice and the real (not formal) frameworks of power. In 
my view, this is the defect in their method.  
J. McGregor’s (1994) method is clear and simple. He proposed a list comprising 43 presidential powers and 
divided them into three groups: a) symbolic, ceremonial, and procedural; b) appointive; and c) political. The index is 
based on the number of powers that each president possesses. Each full presidential power receives “1,” but if a power is 
limited it is considered half a power for computational purposes. The basic score for a country’s presidency is computed 
by adding up all of the powers (pp. 12–16). McGregor took into account the “weight” of different groups of powers: 
appointive powers are twice as important as symbolic, ceremonial, and procedural powers, and political powers are three 
times as important (p. 10). This is true because, for example, awarding decorations, titles, and honors are not tantamount 
to the appointment of a prime minister or proposing legislation.  
J. Hellman (1996) coded the formal constitutional powers of the president depending on the type of regime: in 
presidential systems each exclusive presidential power received “1,” a power with reservations “0.5,” and not given “0”; in 
parliamentary systems with direct presidential elections “0.75,” “0.35,” and “0” respectively; and in parliamentary systems 
with indirect presidential elections “0.5,” “0.25,” and “0”. She explained these differences in coding by the fact that in 
different institutional structures presidential powers have a different weight. 
T. Frye’s (1997) method involved dividing the formal powers of the presidency into two groups: the powers “owned” 
only by the president and those that he performed together with the parliament or the government (shared powers). If the 
president is elected in a general election, each exclusive power is assigned a value of “1,” and each joint power receives 
“0.5.” If not elected in this way, all powers receive “0.5.” All of the numerical values are then summed (pp. 525–526). 
A. Siaroff (2003) measured not only the formal but also the informal powers of the president, which thereby makes 
his method real. He offered a dichotomous indexing system (“1” – yes, “0” – no) and reduced the number of variables to 
nine (pp. 303–305). Noteworthy here is that two variables in his list (direct election of the president and simultaneous 
elections for president and legislature) characterize the form of government rather than the actual powers of the 
president. In doing this, Siaroff measured, quite rightly in my opinion, the most likely form of government, not the 
president’s powers. 
Formal and informal institutions were the focus of L. Johannsen and O. Nørgaard (2003). They offered the so-
called Index of Presidential Authority (IPA), which is constructed using three main constitutional power resources – 
symbolic, appointive, and political. In addition, the IPA seeks to account for the method of presidential election (direct or 
indirect) and length of presidential term. The president can either possess a power in full (coding “1”), in a qualified form 
(coding “1/2”), or not at all (coding “0”) (p. 6). Calculation of the IPA is by way of a specially drawn up formula. 
Measuring presidential power is not an easy task for researchers, and, as noted by J. Fortin (2013), includes some 
“pitfalls” of measurement. She drew attention to the fact that an indice should be valid and reliable: “In constructing 
composite indices of presidential power, the main dilemma seems to revolve around reaching a balance between 
exhaustive measurements that are low in validity and reductive measurements that are higher in validity and reliability, 
but potentially fail to capture important dimensions” (p. 104). She used factor analyses of 29 unweighted and weighted 
presidential power indicators in 28 post-communist countries, and based on this analysis concentrated on six presidential 
powers: package veto, partial veto, exclusive introduction of legislation, cabinet dismissal, cabinet formation, censure (pp. 
105–106). These elements should be measured by a researcher. Fortin came from the fact that a president is not 
considered constitutionally powerful “based on his or her holding a myriad of powers (the more items, the more 
powerful)”; rather, he or she holds a set of key, and universal, central powers (p. 106). If we focus on the main elements 
of presidential power, we receive equivalent and common indicators for all countries, which allow us to compare them. 
Fortin rightly proposed following A. Krouwel (2003), who identified “the core elements of presidentialism,” rather than 
including all powers and prerogatives of the president (p. 6).  
 
3. Methodology: From Measuring Presidential Power to Measuring Political Regimes  
 
The method of measurement developed by Krouwel (2003) is, in my view, the most interesting and fruitful. He goes 
beyond mere analysis of presidential powers to include the “systematic characteristics of political systems as a whole” (p. 
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6), and sees his task as determining the level of presidentialism instead of a mere measurement of presidential 
prerogatives. Krouwel adopts a two-dimensional approach (pure presidentialism and pure parliamentarism) and offers a 
new method based on measuring the presidential score and parliamentary score. He codes the following seven 
constitutional elements: election of the head of state; dissolution of parliament; ministerial appointments; vote of 
investiture before a government takes office; vote of confidence; introduction and veto of legislation; and executive 
powers. In calculating the presidential score, each variable associated with presidentialism receives the score “1,” and 
each variable that is not a characteristic of presidentialism receives the score “0”; when the powers are shared or limited 
the score is “0.5” (pp. 16–17). The presidential score is the sum of the scores for all seven variables of presidentialism, 
and the parliamentary score is the sum of the scores for all seven variables of parliamentarism. The level of 
presidentialism is then calculated by subtracting the parliamentary score from the presidential score. A positive score 
indicates presidentialism, a negative score indicates parliamentarism, and the higher the score, the higher the level of 
presidentialism (p. 9). For example, according to Krouwel, the level of presidentialism for Russia is “+4.5,” for Lithuania 
“+0.5,” for Poland “0.0,” for Romania “-2.0,” and for the Czech Republic “-4.5.”  
Krouwel’s method is valuable because it allows us to “weigh” the presidential and parliamentary components of 
any form of government, whether presidential, parliamentary, or semi-presidential. However, it requires modification, as I 
have done in my previous works (Zaznaev, 2006; Zaznaev, 2007). In particular, I have amended several variables. I have 
divided the variable “ministerial appointment” into “appointment of prime minister” and “appointment of ministers,” divided 
“introduction and veto of legislation” into “introduction of legislation” and “veto of legislation,” and have excluded 
Krouwel’s “vote of confidence.” Finally, I have added two new variables: “compatibility/incompatibility of the position of 
member of legislature with the government position” and “formation of a new cabinet after the presidential and (or) the 
parliamentary elections.” I eventually proposed ten criteria for measuring different systems, whether presidentialism, 
parliamentarism, semi-presidentialism, or any other (Zaznaev, 2006, pp. 192–193).  
 
Table 1. The parliamentary and presidential scores 
 Criteria Presidential score Parliamentary score 
A Election of the head of state 
1 – election of the head of state by the people
0.5 – where only one candidate is nominated, he 
or she is deemed elected without the need for a 
ballot 
0 – the head of state is not elected by the people
1 – the head of state is elected by 
parliament or a special electoral college, or 
he or she inherits the post 
0.5 – where only one candidate is 
nominated, he or she is deemed elected 
without the need for a ballot 
0 – the head of state is elected by the 
people 
B The executive 
1 – the head of state/the president holds the 
executive powers and heads the cabinet (the 
president’s administration) 
0.5 – the head of state/the president shares 
executive powers with the government 
0 – the head of state/the president has no 
executive powers 
1 – the executive is the government 
responsible to parliament 
0.5 – the executive powers are shared 
between the head of state/the president and 
the government 
0 – the government is fully responsible to 
the head of state/the president 
C Appointment of prime minister 
1 – the head of state/the president appoints the 
prime minister (or the head of state/the president 
executes functions of the prime minister) 
0.5 – the head of state/the president shares the 
power to appoint the prime minister with 
parliament (the coordinated appointment) 
0 – the head of state/the president does not 
affect the appointment of the prime minister (or 
the head of state/the president is forced to 
consider the party composition of parliament 
when appointing the prime minister) 
1 – the prime minister is appointed by 
parliament or the head of state/president 
who is forced to consider the party 
composition of parliament 
0.5 – parliament shares the power to appoint 
the prime minister with the head of state/the 
president (the coordinated appointment) 
0 – parliament has no power to influence the 
appointment of the prime minister 
D Appointment of ministers 
1 – the head of state/the president alone 
appoints ministers 
0.5 – the head of state/the president shares the 
prerogative to appoint ministers with the prime 
minister and/or parliament (the coordinated 
appointment) 
1 – the appointment of ministers is the 
prerogative of parliament and/or the prime 
minister 
0.5 – parliament (the prime minister) shares 
the prerogative to appoint ministers with the 
head of state/the president (the coordinated 
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0 – the head of state/the president does not 
affect the appointment of ministers (or the head 
of state/the president is forced to consider the 
opinion of parliament and/or the prime minister) 
appointment)
0 – parliament has no power to influence the 
cabinet portfolio allocation 
 
E Formation of a new cabinet after… 
1 – the presidential election
0.5 – the presidential and the parliamentary 
elections 
0 – the parliamentary election 
1 – the parliamentary election 
0.5 – the presidential and the parliamentary 
elections 
0 – the presidential election 
F Vote of no confidence 
1 – a vote of no confidence can be ignored by the 
head of state/the president and the government 
0.5 – a vote of no confidence always results in 
the resignation of the government or the 
dissolution of parliament 
0 – a vote of no confidence always results in the 
resignation of the government 
(parliament cannot be dissolved in response to a 
no-confidence vote) 
1 – a vote of no confidence always results in 
the resignation of the government 
(parliament cannot be dissolved in response 
to a no-confidence vote) 
0.5 – a vote of no confidence always results 
in the resignation of the government or the 
dissolution of parliament 
0 – a vote of no confidence can be ignored 
by the head of state/president and the 
government 
G Introduction of legislation 
1 – the head of state/the president has the right 
to propose legislation, along with parliament 
(individual MPs, parliamentary groups) and the 
government 
0.5 – the right to propose legislation is vested 
with the head of state/president, parliament, the 
government, and other actors (judges, electorate 
etc.) 
0 – the head of state/the president has no right to 
propose legislation 
1 – the right to propose legislation is only 
vested with parliament (individual MPs, 
parliamentary groups) and the government 
0.5 – the head of state/the president and 
other actors (judges, electorate etc.) have 
the right to propose legislation, along with 
parliament and the government 
0 – the head of state/the president has the 
right to propose legislation, along with 
parliament (individual MPs, parliamentary 
groups) and the government 
H Veto of legislation 
1 – a qualified majority (2/3; 3/4; 3/5; 4/5) in 
parliament is required to override a veto of the 
head of state/the president 
0.5 – a qualified or simple majority vote in 
parliament may override a veto of legislation 
0 – there is no veto of the head of state/the 
president, or despite rejection of a bill put forward 
by the head of state/the president, it enters into 
force (and then this bill is passed by referendum)
1 – there is no veto of the head of state/the 
president, or despite rejection of a bill put 
forward by the head of state/the president, it 
enters into force (and then this bill is passed 
by referendum) 
0.5 –a qualified or simple majority vote in 
parliament may override a veto of legislation 
0 – a qualified majority (2/3; 3/4; 3/5; 4/5) in 
parliament is required to override a veto of 
the head of state/the president 
I Dissolution of parliament 
1 – it is the sole prerogative of the head of 
state/the president to dissolve parliament 
0.5 – the head of state/the president dissolves 
parliament, but initiated by other actors (the 
prime minister, parliament etc.) 
0 – the head of state/the president has no formal 
powers to dissolve parliament 
1 – the head of state/the president has no 
formal powers to dissolve parliament 
0.5 – the head of state/the president 
dissolves parliament, but initiated by other 
actors (the prime minister, parliament etc.) 
0 – it is the sole prerogative of the head of 
state/the president to dissolve parliament 
J 
Compatibility/incompatibility of the 
position of member of legislature 
with the government position 
1 – incompatible
0.5 – compatible for members of one chamber of 
parliament and incompatible for members of 
another chamber 
0 – compatible 
1 – compatible
0.5 – compatible for members of one 
chamber of parliament and incompatible for 
members of another chamber 
0 – incompatible 
 
As with Krouwel’s method, the maximum value for each of the 10 criteria is “1,” the minimum is “0,” and there is the 
intermediate variant “0.5.” Easy to calculate by summing all 10 criterions, the maximum presidential score (PresS) and 
parliamentary score (ParlS) may be 10. I suggest that my method of measuring is based on the calculation of the index of 
the form of government (IFG) (Zaznaev, 2006, p. 194; Zaznaev, 2007, p. 152], which is calculated by subtracting the 
parliamentary score from the presidential score: 
IFG = PresS – ParlS. 
A positive IFG indicates the attraction of a system to presidentialism, and negative its shift to parliamentarism. The 
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higher the numerical value of the index, the greater the presidential elements in a system, the lower the more 
parliamentary. A zero IFG shows a balance of power. All states are placed on a scale of “-10” to “+10.” Therefore, 
calculating IFG provides opportunities not only for a more accurate estimation of separate systems, but also for 
comparing them (Zaznaev, 2007, pp. 162–164). Based on this modified methodology, I calculated the IFG of 22 semi-
presidential countries in Europe and the former Soviet Union. This allowed me to specify three clusters of such systems: 
presidentialized (IFG from +10 to +4), balanced (IFG from +3 to -3), and parliamentarized (IFG from -4 to -10) (Zaznaev, 
2007, p. 154).  
My analysis showed that semi-presidential states of Western, Central, and Eastern Europe are characterized by a 
shift towards a parliamentary system. In these countries, the leading role is played not by the executive branch headed by 
the president but by the parliament, and the results of the legislative elections determine the “face” of the regime. Semi-
presidential republics of the former USSR (except Lithuania, Armenia, and Ukraine, where there have been substantial 
parliamentary transformations), by contrast, show a tendency for presidentialism and super-strong presidential power. If 
you look at the constitutional development of semi-presidential states of Europe and the former Soviet Union in recent 
years, it is easy to distinguish two trends in dynamics – parliamentarization (Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, and Ukraine) 
and presidentialization (Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia etc.) (Zaznaev, 2007, pp. 160–161).  
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
 
Using measurements of presidential power generates a series of questions that must be addressed. Should we consider 
the formal prerogatives of presidents or informal aspects of presidential authority? Is it necessary to seek the assistance 
of experts, thus increasing the risk of unreliability? What should the level of measurement be, and what scale of 
measurement is preferable? Where are the numerical boundaries between strong, moderate, and weak presidencies? 
Should we take into account the particularities of presidential, parliamentary, and semi-presidential regimes in the 
measurement? To what extent does the index of presidential power depend on the president’s personality, and what 
differences are there between indexes of presidential power, for example, in Russia under Putin or Medvedev, i.e. how do 
we measure the dynamics of presidential power?  
Quantitative research into forms of government “paves the way” with difficulties. First, skepticism affects 
academics in the measurement of social phenomena. Second, any measurement is a significant simplification. Therefore, 
any method of measuring presidential power can be easily criticized as not reflecting the objective reality, or even 
distorting it. However, despite the difficulties, the measurement of presidential power and the measurement of other 
components of the legislative-executive relations have gradually offered a perspective on the direction taken in political 
science. 
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